Communism East Europe

Communism East Europe


TITLE: Why did communism collapse in Eastern Europe?

SUBJECT: European Studies B
EDUCATION: First year university
GRADE: first honour
AUTHOR'S COMMENTS: I liked it. Interested to hear other people's
comments.
TUTOR'S COMMENTS: Well done!! Extremely informative. Well
researched. Good Layout. Stress Gorbachev's role more.

Communism is like Prohibition - itÆs a good idea but it wonÆt
work
(Will Rogers, 1927) (1)

This essay will give a brief introduction to communism. It will
then discuss the various factors which combined to bring about
the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. It will examine each
of these factors and evaluate the effect of each. Finally it will
attempt to assertain whether RogersÆ opinion (see above
quotation) on Communism is true, that is, whether communism was
truly doomed to fail from the start, or whether its collapse
was a result of external influences.

Communism is based on the ideas and teachings of Karl Marx as
modified by Lenin. At its most basic, the ideal of communism is a
system in which everyone is seen as equal and wealth is
distributed equally among the people. There is no private
ownership. The state owns and controls all enterprises and
property. The state is run by one leading elite. The Soviet model
of communism was based on these ideals. All opposition parties
were banned although parties who were sympathetic to communism
and who shared the communist ideals were allowed. All power was
concentrated into the hands of the Communist party. Free press
and civil liberties were suppressed. Censorship and
propaganda were widely used. There was state ownership of the
economy. No private enterprise was allowed. There was a
collectivisation of agriculture. The Communist Party invaded and
controlled every aspect of political, social, cultural and
economic life. It was a totalitarian state with complete
Communist control over all facets of life. In the early years,
and up until GorbachevÆs ônew regimeö, the use of force and
terror as a means of maintaining control was widespread.

The first factor which contributed to the failure and eventual
collapse of communism was the fact that the Communist partyÆs
domination was illegitimate from the beginning. Lenin came to
power after a bloody Civil War between those who supported
Lenin and those who opposed the Soviet regime. To Lenin, defeat
was unthinkable and he was prepared to make any and every
sacrifice to win the war and save the revolution. The forcible
requisitioning of food and supplies was approved by Lenin.
This could only be achieved by enforcing strict and absolute
discipline at every level of society. Terror was to become the
chief instrument of power and Lenin was to assume the role of
dictator. This was a phenomenon which was to become a symbol of
communist regimes throughout their lifetime.

This trend was followed when Stalin came to power as leader of
the Communist party and the Russian government in 1929. (2) He
had achieved this through plotting and trickery and by shifting
alliances. This had begun in 1924 when Stalin systematically
began to remove all opposition to his claim to power. His main
rival was Trotsky and he used a number of underhand measures to
discredit him. For example Stalin lied to Trotsky about the date
of LeninÆs funeral, thus ensuring that Trotsky could not attend
and thereby blackening his name in the public eye. This Stalin
versus Trotsky conflict led to Trotsky being eventually exiled
from Russia and, ten years later in 1940, being assassinated by
one of StalinÆs agents. (3)

Under Stalin any opposition was swiftly and brutally crushed. In
no Eastern European country did the revolution have the support
of more than a minority of people, yet this minority retained
absolute control. The communist take-over and subsequent regime
was achieved by undemocratic methods, that is, rigged elections,
terror, totalitarian state, harassment and threats. In 1932 a
two-hundred page document by a fellow member of the Politburo
condemning the Stalinist regime and calling for change was
published. (4) In response to this Stalin wreaked a terrible
revenge. In 1936 Stalin began what became known as the ôpurgesö
whose function it was to try members of the communist party who
had acted treasonously. (5) The result of these was that five
thousand party members were arrested and stripped of their
membership. The sixteen defendants in the three Showtrials of
1936, 1937 and 1938 were found guilty and executed. In 1939 those
who had conducted the purges were also executed. By 1939 the
only member of LeninÆs original Politburo who remained, was
Stalin himself. (6)

In relation to foreign policy, Stalin exerted his influence to
ensure that all Eastern European countries (except Yugoslavia)
had Soviet-imposed puppet regimes. StalinÆs domination was now
total. After the war Stalin succeeded in establishing a communist
buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe. Any resistance he
met in establishing communist states was quickly suppressed by
intimidation and terror. For example Stalin engineered a
communist coup in May 1948 in Czechoslovakia in which a
government minister Masaryk was killed and the president was
forced to resign. (7) This served a warning to other countries
against resisting the communist regime.

Therefore it can clearly be seen that from the establishment of
the state that communism never had popular public support. It
cannot be denied that there was a significant minority who
supported communism, but these were a minority. Can an ideal and
a leadership really be built on such a shallow and flimsy basis?
This essay would argue that the answer to this question is no.
For a leadership to lead, it must have strong support and
confidence. It must be seen to work for the good of the people
and not merely a vociferous minority. This, therefore, can be
argued to be one of the contributing factors in the downfall of
communism.

A second related factor, which had a hand in bringing about the
end of communism in Eastern Europe was the fact that communism
never really had the support of the people. There was constant
societal opposition to communist rule in Eastern Europe. Although
this was mainly in the form of a passive rumbling dissent, there
were occasional violent and active shows of opposition to
communist rule. The states of Eastern Europe in the post-war
period had been forced to adhere to the Moscow line. After 1956
however, with KhrushchevÆs new approach to Socialism and his
denunciation of Stalin, there were increasing calls for
independence among the communist bloc countries who had
never been truly supportive of the communist regime.

In East Germany in 1953 there were a series of strikes and
protests. (8) The Russians, under Stalin, used their armed forces
to put down the revolt and to protect East GermanyÆs communist
government. This shows the importance of Soviet military force
in maintaining communismÆs tenuous grip on power. It also shows
how weak communist rule in East Germany really was, It was this
event that sealed East GermanyÆs fate as the USSR realised that
in a united Germany, the Communists would lose control. Events
eventually culminated with the building of the Berlin Wall which
was the ultimate expression of Soviet and communist force and
coercion in maintaining the communist regime.

Under Khrushchev, who had succeeded Stalin after his death in
1953, Poland was the first to revolt against the communist
regime. Polish workers rioted and went on strike in 1956 and the
Polish communist party also revolted by refusing to accept the
Russian general Rokossovsky as the Polish Minister for Defence.
(9) The situation was diffused by a compromise which was made on
both sides, with Poland agreeing to remain in the communist
Eastern bloc if the nationalist communist leader Gomulka, who had
been imprisoned by Stalin, was reinstated. The fact that
Khrushchev was willing to compromise illustrates again the
precarious position of communist rule.

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was borne out of the relative
success of the Poles in achieving concessions for the Moscow
leadership. (10) The Hungarians decided to overthrow the
Stalinist regime in their country. The situation quickly
deteriorated and on the 23rd of October the Hungarian troops, who
had been dispatched to end the riots, joined the civilians in
revolution. Soviet troops were called in and the Hungarian
communist party lost the little support which they had. Again
Khrushchev tried to diffuse the situation by offering a
compromise, that is, the reinstatement of the moderate
communist leader Nagy. When it became clear, however, that Nagy
had every intention of pulling out of the Soviet communist bloc,
Khrushchev resorted to force and violence to maintain the
communist grip on Hungary. He ordered the return of Soviet tanks
and troops to Budapest on November 4th 1956. (11) Thousands were
killed in a bloody street battle until the Soviets had re-
established their control. Nagy was arrested and was executed two
years later. A Soviet imposed communist regime under Janos Kadar
was set up. (12) The tenuous communist grip on control is again
illustrated here. Khrushchev was willing to barter, and
eventually use force, to maintain Soviet control. Without this
force and coercion, however, Hungary would have established its
own brand of communist rule. Khrushchev could not risk the domino
effect that this action would have had on the Eastern bloc. This
societal opposition can, therefore, be taken to be another
contributing factor in the downfall of communist rule in the
Eastern bloc. If those in the alliance cannot cooperate and work
together, the alliance and the ideal cannot hope to survive.

Another important factor which this essay will discuss is that of
the influence of the West on the Eastern bloc. The Eastern bloc
was already aware of Western capitalist success as they were
allies during the war. Many of the Eastern countries, for example
Hungary under Nagy or Czechoslovakia under Dubcek, were in favour
of a communist system with some elements of capitalism, that is,
a mixed economy or market socialism and more elements of
democracy. There had been a breakdown in relations between the
East and West due to tensions after WWII. After the war Russia
wanted to create a sphere of influence in the East over which the
West would have no say or control. This was not acceptable to the
West who wanted to see democracy installed in the East and
who wanted to have a continued input into the doings of the East.
This conflict ventually led to the Cold War.

Until Khrushchev became leader of the Soviet bloc, there had
been no significant contact between the two blocs. Those inside
of the Soviet bloc were completely cut off from the Western
ideals. When Khrushchev came to power, however, there as renewed
hope in the West that there might be a ôthawö in relations
between the two blocs. Relations between the two blocs did
improve with Khrushchev attending a number of conferences and
meetings. For example a twelve-day visit to the US in 1959, a UN
General Assembly, also in 1959 and a later UN General Assembly
meeting in 1960 in the US. (13) Although then relations began to
break down again due to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961
and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the Eastern bloc became
cut off once more, western ideas had already managed to penetrate
the East. (14) The information that the capitalist West was
thriving while the Communist Eastern bloc was stagnating and
underdeveloped, made communism and Soviet control even more
unpopular.

In 1963 there again was an easing of tensions between the two
blocs when Russia and the US signed a test ban treaty which
allowed the WestÆs influence to again creep into the East. (15)
In 1964 Khrushchev was ousted from power and Brezhnev with
Kosygin took over from him. (16) In 1966 the US and USSR agreed
to a direct air service between Moscow and New York. In 1967
they, along with 60 other countries, signed the first
international treaty providing for the peaceful exploration of
outer space. (17) In the 1970Æs a period of D_tente began. In
1970 West Germany and Poland signed a treaty rejecting the use of
force. West Germany and Russia ratified a similar treaty in 1972.
(18) In 1972 Nixon and Brezhnev signed the SALT I treaty which
was to limit the production of US and Russian nuclear weapons.
In 1973 East and West Germany joined the UN. (19) Throughout
this period the West had more and more access to the Eastern bloc
and the people of the communist countries were influenced by
these ideas. This was a further blow to communist rule and
another factor in the downfall of communism.

The next contributing factor to the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe was that of its economic failure. During the years
of war communism from 1918-1921, Soviet labourers worked for
pittance wages. At the same time the Bolshevik confiscated
virtually all harvests. This brought the country to the brink of
economic collapse. The net result of war communism under Lenin
was that from 1914 the countryside was neglected and destroyed
and in 1920 there was a severe drought. (20) In 1921 the New
Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced. This was in effect a
limited capitalism. Peasants were allowed to keep their surpluses
after taxes were paid. Bonuses, extra rations and better
housing were offered as incentives. Still there was widespread
opposition to the communist policy with the beginnings of a
ôpeasant warö against StalinÆsÆ proposed collectivisation policy
in 1928. (21) Although agricultural production increased, the
standard of living was lowered and hardship was widespread.
Forcible collectivisation was pursued until 1935. This again
shows the peopleÆs general opposition to communist policies.
Collectivisation failed to meet agricultural requirements during
WWII. The human cost of the policy was staggering. If the people
are suffering under a particular regime they will not support it,
how then can this regime hope to survive?

When Khrushchev came to power, he too failed to salvage the
economy. Although some of the policies which he introduced in the
1950Æs had an initial success, they soon collapsed with
disastrous effects. Figures for meat in 1958 were artificially
high but collapsed soon after. In 1962 there were sharp increases
in the prices of butter and meat. (22) Food riots were forcibly
quelled by the shooting of seventy unarmed demonstrators in 1962.
(23) Industry was not faring any better and by 1963 production
levels had declined sharply in every branch of industry. As
Khrushchev himself said of communism in 1958:- ôIf, after forty
years of communism, a person cannot have a glass of milk and a
pair of shoes, he will not believe that communism is a good
thingö (24)

Under Brezhnev the economic state of the USSR continued to
decline. Support for communism was falling and due to improved
relations with the West, the people could see how disadvantaged
they were. Under Andropov who succeeded Brezhnev in 1982
the situation did not improve. Change began only when Gorbachev
came to power in 1985. (25) The major problems in the economy
which Gorbachev had to deal with were, the wasteful use of
resources, the lack of innovation, a poor division of labour, too
many costly products being produced, ineffective use of resources
and low productivity. There was a resistance to technological
innovation due to a lack of incentives. Wages were low and the
mechanisms involved in introducing a new idea or practice were
time-consuming and complicated. There was a general inflexibility
in the enterprise network which also stifled innovation. There
was also a lack of investment in new ideas and industry.
GorbachevÆs solution to these problems was a ôPerestroikaö of the
economy.

The challenge of Perestroika was to move to more intensive
methods of production and more effective use of inputs. His
economic polices began with the promise of a revival of
some of the practices of NEP. His aim was to cause output to
double by the year 2000 and for production and productivity to
rise substantially. It was not until 1987, however, that these
ideas were put into a concrete plan. (26) A vigorous anti-alcohol
campaign was initiated. Vineyards were destroyed and beer
production was cut-back. By 1988, however, they had to admit that
this policy was a complete failure and it was abandoned in 1990.
(27) By 1985 the USSR had a budget deficit of R37 billion. (28)
Due to miscalculations in relation to the extent of the budget
deficit, Gorbachev authorised spending in social and investment
sectors while maintaining the spending in the military sector.
This was a gross mistake which resulted in the budget deficit in
1989 having increased to R100 billion or 11% of the Gross
National Product (GNP) and was predicted to rise to R120 billion.
Therefore, under Gorbachev, the budget deficit rose from 3% in
1985 to 14% in 1989. (29) Inflation increased to over 5%. (30)
Prices failed to reflect the high cost of production and many
companies were working at a loss. This economic failure of
communism meant that support for the system fell and that it was
becoming increasingly more difficult for the communist party to
convince the people that this indeed was the way forward, and a
better solution than capitalism.

Gorbachev therefore aimed to tie salaries into achieved results
and to remove subsidies on some goods and services. He did not
act immediately, however, with his price reform package as he
hoped to first achieve a balance between supply and demand. This
merely worsened matters and wages continued to rise faster than
output and productivity. The main failure of Perestroika is that
it didnÆt remove the old price system. Instead, it allowed the
old price system, which was based on scarcity, to continue, and
this merely exacerbated shortages. Ironically, it was the mass
organisations of people, who had emerged to defend living
standards, who actually hampered the struggle against inflation
and the budget deficit. This situation was partly created by the
fact that the governing party had no popular support and
hadnÆt been popularly elected. The economic situation continued
to decline. There was a zero growth rate. Shops were calculated
to be lacking 243 out 276 basic consumer items and there was a
chronic shortage of 1000 items out of 1200 which would be on a
model shopping list. There was a static farm output and high
levels of inflation. (31) Therefore it can be seen that communism
was an economic disaster. KhrushchevÆs remark again can be used
to illustrate the effect which this had on the support for
communism. (see ref 24).

As previously mentioned, communism never had majority support or
a legitimate political basis. Force and coercion were regularly
used to ensure that the communist party remained in power.
Therefore one can maintain that the fact that communism was
a political failure was also a contributing factor to the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. If a party has not got
the support of a majority, then it has a weak political basis.
The fact that undemocratic means were used to ensure that the
communists came to, and then maintained, power shows that
communism was a political failure. Throughout the history of
communism in Russia, never once did the party gain a majority
support or truly succeed in suppressing public demonstrations of
antipathy towards communism. It can therefore be argued that a
political leadership with no political basis or support
could ever hope to survive.

Another important factor to note is communismÆs utter failure in
relation to society and culture. Soviet society under Communist
rule was socially and culturally underdeveloped. The state had a
say in every aspect of societal life. In response to low
birth rates, large numbers of orphans and the failure of 37/100
marriages in 1934 alone, the communist leadership compelled the
media to promote stable family life. (32) Propaganda was used to
coerce the people into believing in the positive virtues of
marriage and children. Divorce was made more difficult and
abortion was prohibited. Thus the peopleÆs right to choose and
exert control over their own personal and familial decisions was
removed. In schools, the teaching of the social sciences was
curtailed and Marxist and Leninist theories were expounded. In
the late thirties fees were reintroduced for the three upper
forms of secondary school. This effectively meant that only those
who could afford to pay these fees could send their children on
to further academic training as these were the forms which
prepared children for higher education. (33) Under Stalin
topographical, economic and political information and affairs
were a state secret. Maps were inaccurate and details about past
disasters and history were omitted or embellished.

Propaganda and brainwashing was used to ensure that the virtues
of communism were extolled and a cult following was created
around Lenin and Stalin. ôA Short Course on the History of the
CPSUö became the staple intellectual diet of all schoolchildren.
(34) This was a propagandistic book based on an idealistic view
of communism and its leaders. The mass arrests, the truth of the
purges and the labour camps were not allowed to be discussed in
the media. State monopoly of information and mass communications
deployed in this way, and backed by the use of coercion and
force and the military, degraded the nationÆs intellectual and
cultural life. People were simply not allowed to form an opinion
contrary to that of the communist state. People were also not
allowed to choose their own religion or follow their own personal
religious beliefs. The state outlawed and censored religious
ôpropagandaö and publications. The Soviet state actively and
brutally persecuted the churches. A large number of these
were desecrated or destroyed. More than half of all monasteries
were forced to close and in 1921 twenty-eight bishops were
arrested or died in violent clashes with the Soviet military.
(35) Attempts were also made to split the church from the inside.
By 1939 only 12 bishops, out of the 163 who had been active in
1930, remained. (36) These repressive measures, as a whole, meant
that the growth of Soviet culture and society was stunted and
stagnating. The secrecy and lies undermined efficiency, isolated
individuals and eroded the morale of society. This was compounded
by the fact that, due to Western influences, the public in the
communist countries were beginning to realise their predicament
and their backwardness. These measures continued until Gorbachev
came to power.

This point leads onto the most important factor which contributed
to the eventual collapse of communism in the East, that is,
Gorbachev. Without Gorbachev it is doubtful that the
disintegration of the communist regime would have occurred so
soon. Gorbachev can be seen as a reform communist. He introduced
a number of revolutionary reforms like Perestroika and Glasnost.
The combined effect of these policies, and his general attitude
to reform, communism and the USSR, had the effect of causing the
culmination of all opposition to communism and collapsing the
system.

Glasnost proved to be a great relief valve which allowed the
people to voice their long-standing discontent about communism
and the communist regime as a whole. The positive elements of
Glasnost had the effect of bringing national tensions to the
surface of political and social life and, in a sense,
exacerbating the national problem. Liberalisation made people
less afraid of retribution when they spoke out against the
injustices of the system and the atrocities which had occurred.
The ripple effect of GorbachevÆs radical Perestroika and Glasnost
weakened the authority of thecommunist governments -
economically, socially and ideologically. Above all the failure
of communism lay in the failure of GorbachevÆs Perestroika. If
the economy had improved then so too would the peopleÆs well-
being and they may have considered maintaining the communist
regime.

The fundamental problem with Perestroika was how to change a
system which had been built to withstand change. It was
increasingly fractured. It had originally been based on
inaccurate figures about the well-being of the economy and the
national debt. Life under Perestroika became even harder for the
majority of Soviet people. There were no state-employed social
groups or skilled workers who stood to gain from Perestroika in
the short term. Economic reform involved hard work and higher
prices and therefore Perestroika was short on support. As the
economic situation worsened, sotoo did the peopleÆs support for
communism fall. This time there was a difference however. Due to
Glasnost the people and the media were now free to criticise the
policy.

Glasnost had the effect of ensuring that the previous reign of
terror which the communist leadership had held, was brought to an
end. Gorbachev employed a policy of ôGlasnostö, that is, openness
and the right to criticise and express an opinion. Up until
then Soviet society was closed. No criticism or freedom of speech
was allowed. The major feature of Glasnost is that of the lifting
of most of the restrictions which had beenimposed on the
circulation of information since communism began. The blank pages
in history were about to be filled in. Gorbachev realised that
the former policy of absolute secrecy was a major force holding
back the development of society. Censorship was relaxed. This had
the adverse effect of allowing the public criticism of a regime
which previously could not be criticised.

Gorbachev also allowed increasing independence to the Eastern
bloc states. He had come to the conclusion that compelling an
unwilling population to live under a system they detested was not
ensuring the USSRÆs security, but on the contrary, jeopardising
it. He indicated by omission, rather than by direct statement,
that he would not obstruct a change which would result in these
states achieving a measure of independence.

In Czechoslovakia on the 18th of January 1989 there was a
decision taken to legalise Solidarity. (37) On the 10th of
February the Hungarian communists agreed to a multi-party system
and there was no opposition to this on the part of the Soviets.
On 29th March Moscow told the Hungarians that they would not
interfere in East European affairs. (38) In Poland on January
18th, Solidarity had been legalised after a string of protests
and riots in Hungary. (39) This led to an agreement between the
communist government and Solidarity, the main focus of which was
the holding of the first relatively free elections since the
1940Æs in Poland. The elections were devastating to the
communists. They were swept out of the Senate and did not have
any representatives elected to the Sejm until the second round of
counting. (40)

This had a domino effect and hastened events elsewhere. Far from
GorbachevÆs original hope that allowing the Eastern states more
freedom would bring the union closer together, it was tearing the
union apart. Kadar was ousted from Hungary and the communists
were swept aside by the Hungarian Democratic Forum. On September
11th Hungary opened its borders with Austria and allowed
thousands of East Germans to cross to the west. (41) The people
of East Germany were demanding Glasnost and Perestroika. On
October 9th a mass demonstration of 70,000 people occurred in
Leipzig. (42) Thousands of Germans were escaping to the west
through Hungary and the GDR was powerless to stop them. Honecker,
the East German leader, buckled under the pressure and resigned.
The net effect of which was that his successors allowed the
opening of the Berlin Wall on 8th November 1989 after the East
German government and communist leadership resigned. (43)

On the 24th of November the Czechoslovak Communist Party resigned
after mass demonstrations in Prague of up to 800,000 people. On
the 7th of December the communist government in Czechoslovakia
collapsed entirely and a new non-communist government was formed.
(44)

GorbachevsÆs reforms were wreaking havoc on the communist system.
Its base, already weak and fragile, began to crumble away under
the massive wave of anti-communist feeling which had finally come
to the fore after years of suppression. On the 11th of December
Bulgarian communists were forced to agree to a multi-party system
and on the 25th, the Rumanian leader Ceausescu and his wife were
tried and executed. (45) All of this was borne out of GorbachevÆs
reforms. The communist regime had been built on force and
coercion, terror and undemocratic methods. This regime could
therefore not be expected to survive under such an onslaught. In
refusing the Eastern bloc communist parties aid to suppress the
revolts within, Gorbachev effectively sealed their fate. The
communist parties in those countries had always relied on Soviet
force for support in maintaining control of the countries, now
that his support had been removed the regimes crumbled. Therefore
the significance of the Gorbachev factor cannot be denied when
discussing the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe. If
Gorbachev had not introduced his reforms or had not refused aid
to the other Eastern bloc communist parties, the communist regime
may have still stood today. Gorbachev may not have been the cause
of the downfall, but he was certainly the trigger. The situation
was like a fuse, Gorbachev merely provided the matches and
refused to stop the fire.

The final factor which this essay will examine, is that of the
loss of elite party confidence. With his reforms Gorbachev had
undermined the morale and confidence of the party elite. It had
become clear that the communist cause had exhausted itself and
was a failure. Their utopian hopes had been torn apart one by one
throughout the years and Gorbachev had made them face this fact.
This had a paralysing effect on them and led to their apathy
about the ending of communism. If they had believed that there
was something left to fight for they may have used physical force
to overthrow Gorbachev and suppress the revolts, but they did
not. Gorbachev had launched a step-by-step dismantling of the
party and the nomenklatura under Perestroika. He separated and
neutralised his most militant opponents among the conservative
members of the party elite. At the 28th Congress the party elite
was divided between those who would monitor the development of
Glasnost and perestroika, and the Presidency who would champion
the fight against the unreformable members of the nomenklatura.
(46) Until the 28th Congress membership of the nomenklatura had
been a ticket to wealth and power, after the conference it became
a mere shell. Membership fell off and loyalties faded. A form
of local government control was implemented by Gorbachev to
further diminish the role of the Politburo. Piece by piece
Gorbachev was chipping away at the old eliteÆs confidence and
beliefs. The fact that Gorbachev was gaining support both from
the public at home and abroad, further eroded their confidence.

When the USSR began to collapse, however, certain voices in the
party refused to allow Gorbachev dismantle more of their dreams.
Yelstin was emerging at this time as an opponent to GorbachevÆs
rule. In response Gorbachev banned a pro-Yelstin rally in
Moscow in 1991. (47) Alarmed at a series of political strikes and
a growing support for Yelstin, Gorbachev negotiated a compromise
which stipulated that in return for an end to political strikes,
Gorbachev would negotiate a new Union treaty which would give
power to the republics. The day before this treaty was to be
signed, however, its opponents moved to forestall it. Pugo
announced that he was assuming presidential control as Gorbachev
was ill and declared a state of emergency. (48) Gorbachev
refused to concur with this announcement. Yelstin called for a
general strike and said that the emergency government was
ôunconstitutionalö. (49) Some workers went on strike, more did
not. Battle lines were being drawn and the complete collapse of
communism was not far behind. The leaders of the coup were
arrested by GorbachevÆs men and Gorbachev returned to Moscow.

The failed coup ironically however, had precipitated the process
it had been trying to prevent, that is, the break up of the USSR
and the demise of the communist party. In the Russian parliament
Yelstin signed a decree suspending the communist party pending
an investigation of the coup. Gorbachev had triumphed over the
plotters but now had to capitulate to Yelstin. After a vain
attempt at protest, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of
the CPSU and recommended that the General Committee should
disband itself. In June 1991 Yelstin was elected president of
Russia. (50) After the failure of the coup most of the Soviet
republics declared their independence and sovereignty.
Gorbachev tried unsuccessfully to revive the Union treaty for
several months afterwards, but to no avail. The chain of events
had been set in motion and could not be stopped now.

On the 8th of December 1991 Yelstin, along with the Beloruissian
and Ukraine leaders issued a statement which declared the end of
the USSR. They offered a ôCommonwealth of Independent Statesö in
return and invited other countries to join. (51) Gorbachev
protested at first but then bowed to the inevitable. Communism in
Eastern Europe had collapsed. On the 25th of December 1991, he
tendered his resignation as president of the USSR and the
communist flag was lowered from the Kremlin dome to be replaced
by the Russian tricolour. (52)

Communism in Eastern Europe, therefore, collapsed for a number of
reasons. It had no political basis or popular support. It was
riddled with economic problems and, in comparison to capitalism,
was a complete failure. Finally the Gorbachev factor and the
loss of elitist party confidence fanned the flames and destroyed
communism. Communism broke down because of fatal weaknesses built
into the system from its inception. It is in a humanÆs nature to
aim for success and prosperity. Communism denies the competitive
trait which is inherent in all humans. Communism was rejected
because it is not as good as alternative systems of satisfying
humans material wants. Communism also is at odds with the other
most basic instinct which a human has, that is, the desire for
freedom. Communism, in practice, denied the expression of civil
liberties, opinions and thought. It was also a forced rule which
was only enforced by terror, not acceptance or majority ruling.
Such a regime could only hope to last for a certain period,
never indefinitely. GorbachevÆs reforms were merely the catalyst
for this failure. Gorbachev wished to reform the system, not
destroy it, but the situation rapidly went out of control as
years of pent-up frustration and antipathy toward the communist
regime was finally given expression.

Can we therefore validate the quotation by Rogers which was made
at the start of this essay? This essay would argue yes. A regime
which is inherently against human nature can never hope to
succeed. It is human to want what we cannot have and to be denied
it, as with prohibition, makes us all the more determined and
curious to achieve that which is forbidden. The same can be said
to be true for communism. Therefore this essay would conclude
that although there were a number of external contributory
influence to the collapse of communism, communism as an ideal
cannot hope to survive for long in anything more than a
theoretical sense, as it is inherently contrary to the basic
drives of human nature.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Various Inputs, Chronicle of the 20th Century Quotations
(Guinness Publishing Ltd., 1996) page 36

(2) Various Inputs, World Book Encyclopaedias (World Book Inc.,
1984) page 727

(3) Kehoe, A.M, Makers of 20th Century Europe (Mentor
Publications Ltd., 1988) page 25

(4) Ibid., page 32

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid., page 33

(7) Ibid., page 40

(8) OÆ Brien, Eileen, Modern Europe 1870-1966 (Mentor
Publications Ltd., 1995) page 231

(9) Kehoe, A.M, op cit., page 50

(10) Ibid.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Ibid., page 52

(14) Ibid.

(15) Various Inputs, op cit. (1984) page 618b

(16) Ibid., page 618a

(17) Ibid., page 618b

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Kehoe, A.M, op cit. page 13

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid., page 55

(23) Ibid.

(24) Various Inputs, op cit. (1996) page 142

(25) Sakwa, Richard,Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990 (Philip
Allan, 1990) page 271

(26) Ibid.

(27) Ibid., page 272

(28) Ibid.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Ibid., page 281

(32) Hosking, Geoffrey, A History of the Soviet Union (Fontana
Press, 1992) page 213

(33) Ibid., page 215

(34) Ibid., page 218

(35) Ibid., page 228

(36) Ibid., page 235

(37) Ibid., page 245

(38) Ibid.

(39) Ibid.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid., page 466

(42) Ibid.

(43) Ibid.

(44) Ibid.

(45) Ibid., page 468

(46) Novikov, Euvgeny & Bascio, Patrick, Gorbachev and the
Collapse of the Soviet Communist Party (Peter Lang Publishing
Inc., 1994) page 68

(47) Hosking, Geoffrey, op cit. page 494

(48) Ibid., page 495

(49) Ibid.

(50) Ibid., page 497

(51) Ibid., page 498

(52) Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brown, Archie, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press,
1996)

Hosking, Geoffrey, A History of the Soviet Union (Fontana
Press, 1992)

Kehoe, A.M, Makers of 20th Century Europe (Mentor Publications
Ltd., 1988)

Miller, R.F & Miller, J.H & Rigby, T.H, Gorbachev at the Helm
(Croom Helm, 1987)

Novikov, Euvgeny & Bascio, Patrick, Gorbachev and the Collapse of
the Soviet Communist Party (Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1994)

OÆ Brien, Eileen, Modern Europe 1870-1966 (Mentor Publications
Ltd., 1995)

Sakwa, Richard, Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990 (Philip
Allan, 1990)

Swain, Geoffrey & Swain, Nigel, Eastern Europe Since 1945 (St.
MartinÆs Press Inc., 1993)

Various Inputs, Chronicle of the 20th Century Quotations
(Guinness Publishing Ltd., 1996) Various Inputs, World Book
Encyclopaedias (World Book Inc., 1984)

Word Count: 5774